"a fascinating speculation"

In this paper, we explore the possibility of primary consciousness in two disparate vertebrate and non-vertebrate non-mammalian species: birds and octopuses.1 We explicitly avoid issues related to first person report and higher-order consciousness, except in a few instances where the evidence can be stringently assessed. While many attempts to assay animal consciousness and cognition rest almost entirely upon ethological evidence (Griffin, 1976 and Griffin and Speck, 2004), we look beyond behavior to neuroanatomy and neurophysiology. We argue that the necessary conditions for primary consciousness in non-mammalian species must include the following: (1) identification of neural structures that are the functional equivalents of cortex and thalamus; (2) neural dynamics analogous to those observed in mammals during conscious states;2 and (3) rich discriminatory behavior that suggests a recursive linkage between perceptual states and memory (Edelman, 1987 and Edelman, 1989).

Sufficient conditions for consciousness are difficult to establish. By focusing on necessary conditions, our review strongly suggests that birds are excellent candidates for deeper experimental investigations into the possibility that their brains might give rise to conscious states. We use the octopus as a kind of counter example, given the fact that the cephalopod nervous system and phenotype have no resemblance at the systems level to those of humans or birds. However, it remains a fascinating speculation that consciousness of one form or another could have emerged in creatures such as octopuses, which exhibit rich behavior and discriminatory capacity, and possess complex nervous systems.

…from:
Consciousness and Cognition
Volume 14, Issue 1 , March 2005, Pages 169-187
Neurobiology of Animal Consciousness
“Identifying hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species”
by David B. Edelman, Bernard J. Baars and Anil K. Seth; The Neurosciences Institute, 10640 John Jay Hopkins Drive, San Diego, CA 92121, United States
Received 22 June 2004. Available online 23 November 2004.

….Sounds like progress, although there's somethng troubling about that "deeper experimental investigations", knowing how researchers sometimes go about going deep with nonhumans.

[sketch by Doug Millison]